It's fun to speculate

Alex Salmond looking rather pleased with himself after getting David Cameron’s signature on the Edinburgh Agreement.

I was neither shocked nor even surprised when I read the headline over the top article on The National’s website this morning—Scotland Office blocks release of files on Section 30 and independence. They would, wouldn’t they? If you’ll forgive the mixed metaphor, the newspaper’s Freedom of Information (FoI) request took something of a scattergun approach to its fishing expedition.

We asked for any internal documents – such as briefs, emails, meeting notes and minutes – which refer to Scottish independence, a Section 30 order, a referendum, the SNP and the Scottish Greens.

Our request also included asking for any material that Scotland Office ministers or senior officials may have sent to Number 10, the Cabinet Office or the Treasury.

We are not told what time period the FoI covered, but I strongly suspect this would constitute a very large proportion of the paperwork generated by the Scotland Office in any period. Given that the period included a Scottish general election and that John Swinney had telegraphed his intention to beg permission to hold another sham independence referendum, it might have been a good idea to limit the FoI request to records mentioning or alluding to a Section 30 order. After all, we are already acquainted with how the British establishment regards the SNP and the SGP. Material relating to Swinney’s supplication for a Section 30 order would be the juicy stuff.

It would, for example, be interesting to know whether the British state’s man in Scotland had briefed his bosses in London on the pros and cons of granting Swinney’s request. Prior to the election, I remarked that if Keir Starmer were smart, he’d shoot Swinney’s fox by offering a Section 30 order before the election, slapping some crippling conditions on the thing after Swinney had accepted the offer with ill-advised alacrity.

I’ll wager the Brits gamed this strategy at some point. If they had believed there was some ‘Big Secret Plan’ that would come into play following refusal of a Section 30 order, a preemptive offer might have seemed an appealing option. Perhaps appealing enough to outweigh the media mauling that would surely be prompted by Starmer ‘pandering to those uppity Jocks’. But, of course, if they had gamed the scenario, they would have concluded that there was no ‘Big Secret Plan’. So, the inevitable accusations of ‘going soft on separatism’ would be the clincher.

Another thing that might well have been revealed had the FoI succeeded is internal discussion of how the British state’s propaganda machinery might encourage the idea that the election be a de facto referendum on independence. This too would have suited Unionists very nicely. Especially if John Swinney had pinned a ‘Yes’ win to the SNP getting an outright majority. In the highly unlikely event of such a win, Unionists could dismiss the idea that it was a referendum, and if/when the SNP failed to get a majority of seats, they could say we’d had our second referendum and should shut up about independence for the next few decades.

The image at the top of this article is one of my favourite pictures of Alex Salmond. I imagine him looking justifiably smug having got the best deal possible while David Cameron realises he has given away too much. In my mind I picture Keir Starmer and John Swinney in a similar pose but with the roles reversed—Starmer looking like the cat that got the canary while John Swinney belatedly sees the trap he has walked into.

The Sunday National’s FoI request may have suffered the same fate as Swinney’s Section 30 supplication, but we can have a bit of fun speculating as to what might have been revealed.